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Electricity Markets $64,000
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𑠀 David B. Spence
𑠀 July 1, 2016
Each summer, I have the good fortune of being able to teach a
class in Edinburgh, Scotland, where I am as I write this.  Today, I
turned on the BBC equivalent of C-SPAN to find the UK Energy
Minister, Andrea Leadsom, testifying before a parliamentary
committee about the very same question that plagues American
electricity markets: namely, how to ensure a reliable and affordable
supply of electricity as renewables command a growing share of
the supply and competitive markets set the price.  This has been
the $64,000 question in electricity markets for some time now, one
that is not as simple (and is more worrisome) than either free
marketers or green energy advocates appreciate.
One might ask why this is a problem at all.  As with any good or
service, when the supply gets scarce, the price will go up,
consumers will purchase less of the product, and suppliers will
supply more of it.  Just let the market work its magic and all will be
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fine.  But applying textbook microeconomic principles to electricity
markets has proven difficult for regulators.  They have an obligation
to ensure a secure supply and a long tradition – indeed, a statutory
mandate – to ensure the prices are fair.  And they answer to
elected leaders who will be unhappy if the lights go out or the price
spikes to unprecedented levels, as it did in California in 2000-01.
In those American markets that retain traditional electric utility price
regulation, security of supply is provided by government-set rates
that guarantee generators a positive rate of return on their
generation investments.  But in the Northeast, Midwest, California,
and center of the country (the Great Plains and Texas), wholesale
electricity prices are set by competitive markets, and regulators
there worry that market prices will not provide a sufficient incentive
for generators to remain on the grid or for investors to build new
generation.
Why might that be?
Buyers on wholesale markets don’t much care what generation
technology supplies their electricity; they simply want electricity
when they need it.  Competitive markets drive down the price of
electricity pretty efficiently, to the benefit of buyers on wholesale
markets, and ultimately their customers.  But those markets do not
do a good job of capturing the reliability of supply from a particular
generator, or of the system as a whole, in the wholesale spot price.
Regulators traditionally impose a very high standard of reliability on
electricity markets;  keeping the lights on has traditionally been the
prime directive for electricity market regulators.  Reliability includes
the security of the fuel supply (Is it there when you need it?) and
the speed with which a generator can meet an increased demand
for power. Different generators have different abilities to satisfy
these two dimensions of reliability.
Coal-fired power plants and nuclear power plants, the traditional
base load sources of electricity, each have a relatively secure fuel
supply.  Neither depends upon real-time supply of fuel, and
supplies of coal and uranium are abundant from domestic or via
imports from friendly, stable countries.  On the other hand, these
types of plants are not able to “ramp” – to increase or decrease
production levels, especially from a cold start – as quickly as other
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technologies.
Natural gas-fired power plants can ramp much more quickly and
are better at responding to short-term increases in demand.  On the
other hand, they rely upon real-time supply via pipelines for fuel
supply.  Thus, interruptions of gas supply mean interruptions in
electricity generation from gas-fired plants.  We saw this in Texas in
the cold snap of 2011, and northeastern markets experienced the
same thing during the polar vortex of 2014.
Renewable generators like wind and solar power also rely on an
interruptible real-time supply of “fuel” and can generate only when
the wind and the sun are available.  Despite great progress in
predicting when and how much wind and solar power will be
available, at least over short periods of time, these sources score
lower on both dimensions of reliability than traditional sources.
Under traditional regulation, utilities or regulators could insist on
fuel diversity in the electricity generation mix to ensure that these
various dimensions of reliability were well satisfied.  Under
competition, however, it is the market that determines which plants
will be used, and which will be built. As these different technologies
compete in wholesale spot markets, it is the marginal price (closely
associated with the fuel price) of each generator that determines
the spot price.  Thus, the drastic reduction in the price of natural
gas in recent years (caused by the shale gas revolution) has
allowed natural gas-fired power to command an ever larger share
of electricity markets at the expense of both coal-fired and nuclear
power plants.  And because the “fuel” for wind and solar power is
free, their increasing presence on wholesale spot markets drive
down the spot market price even further.
The result over time is the displacement of more reliable sources of
electricity with less reliable ones.  Hence regulators concerns about
system reliability.
That is why managers of some competitive wholesale markets in
the United States have turned to so-called “capacity markets,”
which provide extra payments to generators merely to be available
in case they are needed at some specified time in the future.  The
British also have a capacity market, about which the energy
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minister, Ms. Leadsom, was testifying today.
Capacity markets are controversial with some politicians (hence the
Parliamentary hearing today) because they represent an added
cost that consumers ultimately must pay.  Some economists don’t
like them because they represent a departure from the way markets
ought to work. Ideally, if buyers on wholesale markets want
reliability, they should pay for it via higher prices when electricity is
scarce.  Perhaps consumers don’t want as much reliability as
regulators insist upon.  Perhaps they would prefer not to pay prices
that reflect capacity payments to generators, and would accept a
less reliable electric supply.  Let buyers’ willingness to pay be our
guide, they say.
Politicians and regulators seem unwilling to follow this prescription,
however.  In her testimony, Ms. Leadsom (representing the
Conservative Party government) made clear that maintaining a
mandatory, high level of system reliability was “non-negotiable,”
and that capacity markets provided generators with an important
and necessary income supplement to ensure that reliability. 
Wholesale market managers in the American northeast and
Midwest have made a similar choice.  Indeed, some American
regulators are growing increasingly concerned about the inability of
nuclear power plants to remain viable on competitive wholesale
markets, and are exploring other ways to compensate them for
remaining open.  Even in Texas, where politicians and regulators
have tried to create a market that follows a textbook design,
regulators still worry about (and intervene to ensure) system
reliability.
And they do so for understandable reasons.  Economists often
assume that market behavior produces a better and more accurate
reflection (or expression) of the popular will than does political
participation.  That assumption, embraced by a sizeable segment of
legal scholars as well, is dubious.  In addition to the problem of
pricing reliability, real-world electricity markets impose barriers to
entry for generation that slow or prevent rational supply-side
reactions to price fluctuations.  There are other friction points
between wholesale sellers and retail sellers of electricity as well
that interfere with the efficient transmission of price signals to
consumers.  And more fundamentally, willingness to pay is a flawed
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measure of “what people want” because it is so dependent on their
ability to pay.
I have written about this at greater length here, but the key take-
away is that electricity market regulation (including the imposition of
capacity markets) reflects a collective choice to change the market
allocation of the costs and benefits among the various participants
in those markets.  To characterize it as some sort of political
distortion of a market ideal is unhelpful and misleading.  The goal of
electricity market policy is to balance cost-effectiveness, reliability,
and environmental performance in ways the public prefers.  It is not
to vindicate economists’ view of human nature or how to maximize
welfare.
This interplay between electricity markets and their regulators over
how to provide the balance the public wants is the $64,000
question of electricity policy.  More literally, it is probably closer to a
$billion question.  And as competitive markets in Europe, the United
States and elsewhere integrate more and more renewable
generation, the task will grow more difficult, requiring regulators to
use an increasingly deft touch.
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